June 28th, 2022 |
By Elena Graham, Intern, Beyond Earth Institute
After reading Can Democracies Fly in Space?: The Challenge of Revitalizing the U.S. Space Program by WD Kay, the size, expense, and complexity of human spaceflight (HSF) missions seemed antithetical to American bureaucracy. But I was curious to modernize Kay’s work, adapting the 1995 research to focus on the development of international HSF programs from 2000 to 2020, to understand if effective space policy was possible under a democratic regime. The research this article is derived from creates metrics to compare international human spaceflight (HSF) programs to understand how the United States and its partners can conduct more launches, tests, and missions oriented toward increasing the human presence beyond Earth. To do so, nations were categorized according to regime style to understand if the cyclical, politicking nature of a democratic regime like the United States hinders the development of long-term policy. The goal of this research is to exemplify the lessons that international partners like Japan, Russia, and China can teach American leaders about human spaceflight policy to improve space policy implementation and mission development.
Before looking at the limitations and strengths of international space policy, it is crucial to understand what makes effective policy. According to the former director of the National Space Council, Dr. Scott Pace, human spaceflight requires international cooperation, private sector initiatives, and a focused national strategy to provide a coherent context for both cooperative agreements and private ventures. Thus, from a policy perspective, what differentiates human spaceflight missions from scientific or satellite launches is the necessity for long-term policy planning and extensive capital investment, either from the government or through the creation of an environment favorable to industry and international partnerships. Within this research, the metrics necessary for effective policy are broken down into consistency and flexibility. To have consistent policy is to have consistent and supportive policy goals that establish explicitly proposed timelines for manned spaceflight missions and benchmarks for technology research and development (R&D). However, there are also variable influences that impact the prioritization of political initiatives such as corruption in authoritarian regimes or public support in democratic regimes, which also influence how government officials prioritize space policy. The second metric, flexibility, pertains to how the bureaucratic structure of the government can adapt to technological innovation and the evolving private sector. To create effective policy that results in more actual missions rather than canceled initiatives, the human space flight program within each state must adapt to restructuring and funding changes, support commercial industry, and incorporate international perspectives through its policy.
Looking at Russia, China, Japan, and the United States, overall HSF programs within authoritarian regimes have greater political and technical consistency. This isn’t surprising, as space programs in authoritarian regimes rely on the impetus given by executive leadership to direct policy priorities. Thus, the lack of free elections and consolidation of government power results in greater consistency and emphasis on policy priorities once they are established. For example, the Chinese National Space Agency (CNSA) has established and faithfully executed a 3-step process to establish the Tiangong Space Station, demonstrating new HSF capabilities with each 2013 and 2016 test. However, what is curious is that while centralization of power allows authoritarian regimes to complete missions and meet benchmarks on time, the likelihood of corruption and embezzlement in authoritarian states hinders R&D substantially. In 2013, over 13% of the total budget for the Vostochny Cosmodrome was diverted nefariously from Roscosmos, hindering R&D and creating a negative public image that constrained cooperative opportunities for the Russian space program. For Russia and China alike, poor international perceptions and breaches of international obligations also limit cooperative opportunities. Conversely, space programs in democratic regimes are susceptible to legislative politicking and greater geopolitical influences. While HSF has remained a consistent principle of United States space policy for the past two decades, partisan disputes have resulted in inconsistent directives and funding – culminating in the cancellation of 38% of American HSF missions in the last two decades. These constantly changing priorities result in less effective long-term planning, struggles to adhere to comprehensive timelines, and a lack of prioritization of HSF initiatives.
However, as you might be able to predict, democratic regimes offer greater bureaucratic flexibility for space programs, resulting in more efficient incorporation of structural reforms and diverse perspectives in policy creation and implementation. Democracies like the United States have better international and commercial integration, as a more flexible government structure can easily evolve to tackle regulatory and investment issues, creating greater opportunities for investors and international collaboration. Thus, political protections for private industry and economic stability in democratic regimes seemingly provide the greatest benefit to democratic HSF programs. For example, launch and mission failures in the early 2000s resulted in ambitious structural changes to the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency in 2001 and 2005 through the Basic Law of Space Activities to overcome poor management and better direct policy. While for Russia, the inefficiency of the space sector, which has been accused of using R&D funding for other ends and cites insufficient budgets to justify the absence of results, stems from the poor implementation of bureaucratic reforms to revitalize the industry. Even in China, commercial investment requires legal certainty, stability, and predictability, with the lack of easy structural reform and overly restrictive regulations increasing uncertainty for investors. As a result, authoritarian regimes struggle to overcome their restrictive public image, harming potential international cooperation and limiting potential investors in national space industries. Authoritarian corruption also makes effectively reforming programs difficult, further limiting authoritarian regimes’ ability to quickly improve their space program to keep pace with the rapidly evolving international commercial space market.
Overall, Russia and China have utilized more effective HSF policy in mission development as political centralization allows missions to be fully funded with less frequent development setbacks, test failures, or mission cancellations. Yet, with greater potential for international cooperation and commercial ventures, flexibility within a democratic regime creates new avenues to ensure stability. Research has demonstrated that HSF requires a commitment to the program to secure the necessary funding for missions, and in democracies like the United States or Japan, there will likely need to be a strong driver for national pride, security, or economics. Whether it be a nationalist call to the stars or a meteor mining goldrush, HSF missions will have to fill a political need to gain the necessary support. International commitments to HSF missions and increased affordability through commercial partnerships can ensure greater public demand for government consistency in developing and implementing HSF. Conversely, HSF programs in authoritarian regimes are at risk of leadership reprioritization, either diverging from long-term mission goals or cutting funding, but do not have the same safeguard in being able to easily branch out to commercial or international partners. The future of HSF in the United States will depend on how commercial and international partnerships are used to overcome the lack of long-term stability offered by authoritarian regimes.
The consensus that there must be some balance between consistent federal policy and a flexible bureaucracy is not new, but where we are all trying to go is. So, when we choose to approach human spaceflight and the policy necessary to make these missions a reality, we must not do so with the same perspectives we had before but rather one informed by what has verifiably worked for others. We know from history that a consistent impetus toward a goal is necessary to achieve the funding and prioritization necessary to reach the moon. We know from our modern-day partners that a secure, flexible bureaucracy is necessary to develop an evolving and dynamic private industry. So, the questions become not how we create better human spaceflight policy, but how do we balance the necessity of federal and private support and create the most conducive political atmosphere. In Russia, dedication to the Soyuz program since 1991 has demonstrated a commitment to pursuing HSF; yet launch and mission failures in 2010-2011 have brought Russia’s traditional strength in reliable launch vehicles into question. So, while the aging industrial base has begun to wane Russian influence in the international space community, Chinese influence has risen to take its place through initiatives like the Belt and Road Spatial Information Corridor. As we consider the future values and principles of the communities developed beyond Earth, the Unites States should consider avenues for international space cooperation with China or risk losing influence with the growing number of newly-space faring nations. Countries are largely limited by their own socio-political norms, but through space, there is a new place for collaboration somewhere between these original societies.
BIO: Elena Graham is a Beyond Earth Intern. She is a recent graduate from the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, earning a Bachelor of Art in International Affairs with a concentration in cybersecurity policy. She has previously interned at the Institute for the Study of War categorizing emerging international technology threats and at the Congressional Office of Representative Brian Babin researching for the House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics. She plans to combine her passion for technology and policy through pursuing a JD focusing on Space Law.
